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The poor favor redistribution and the rich oppose it, but that is not all. Social
mobility may make some of today’s poor into tomorrow’s rich and since redistribu-
tive policies do not change often, individual preferences for redistribution should
depend on the extent and the nature of social mobility. We estimate the determi-
nants of preferences for redistribution using individual level data from the US, and
we …nd that individual support for redistribution is negatively a¤ected by social
mobility. Furthermore, the impact of mobility on attitudes towards redistribution
is a¤ected by individual perceptions of fairness in the mobility process. People
who believe that the American society o¤ers equal opportunities to all are more
averse to redistribution in the face of increased mobility. On the other hand, those
who see the social rat race as a biased process do not see social mobility as an
alternative to redistributive policies.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Amongst the three traditional roles of the government, provision of public goods,
stabilization and redistribution, the latter is increasingly important in today’s in-
dustrial countries. In 1960 the average share of government transfers was about
8 per cent of GDP in OECD countries, versus about 15 percent of provision of
public goods and services. Today these two …gures are about 16 per cent and
17 per cent. Thus, while the share of social spending and transfers has doubled,
that of government consumption has stayed roughly constant: the growth of gov-
ernment of the last few decades is largely due to the growth of the redistributive
side of government policies.1 In order to explain the size of government in indus-
trial democracies one must therefore understand what are the determinants of the
demand for redistributive policies.
Since redistribution is intended to go from the wealthy to the poor, one would
expect the latter to favor it and the former to oppose it.2 However, the political
economy of redistribution is more complex. To the extent that today’s poor may
be the wealthy of tomorrow, social mobility should a¤ect individual preferences for
redistributive policies. Thus, in more socially mobile communities, the support for
redistribution should be lower. We …nd considerable support for this e¤ect in our
analysis of United States data: the higher the chance that an individual has to
become relatively “rich”, the lower her support for redistributive policies. In order
to evaluate individual chances of upward mobility, we study both the individual’s
actual history of social mobility and the degree of social mobility in the state where
the individual lives or in the United States as a whole. It would be interesting to
explore cross country comparisons of social mobility and redistributive policies,
but data limitations are prohibitive at this point.3
An important debate in public policy concerns the question of whether equal
opportunities for all make redistributive policies unnecessary. We …nd that, to
some extent, people see substitutability between equal opportunities and redistri-
bution: in particular, those who believe that the United States is a land of (equal)
1All the data are from OECD. These …gures may actually underestimate the amount of re-
distribution since some of the government wage bill, which is classi…ed as consumption of goods
and services, has a redistributive component (see Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (2000) on US data,
and Alesina, Denninger and Rostagno (2001) on Italian data).
2Sometimes the lower middle class may bene…t more than the very poor from redistributive
policies, as argued by Peltzman (1980) for the United States, by Van de Walle and Nead (1995)
f o rd e v e l o p i n gc o u n t r i e s ,a n di nas u r v e yb yA l e s i n a( 1 9 9 8 ) .
3See Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison (1992). After a comprehensive review of the lit-
erature, these authors conclude that “it is impossible to draw general conclusions” about cross
country comparisons of social mobility. The literature that followed has not changed this con-
clusion signi…cantly, yet.
.
1opportunities for all do not look favorably at government redistribution. Instead,
those who believe that the social “rat race” is not a fair game, support government
intervention in redistributive matters and do not appreciate social mobility as a
substitute for redistribution, precisely because they perceive the social mobility as
systematically biased. We also …nd that altruism and risk aversion make people
more sympathetic toward redistribution and that individual characteristics like
sex, race and education also matter. Ceteris paribus, the respondents’ preferences
for redistribution decrease with their level of education; women are more favorable
to redistribution, as are racial minorities (in particular, blacks). The latter result is
consistent with a vast literature on the racial dimensions of redistributive policies
in the US.4
Important contributions in this area include Romer (1975) and Meltzer and
Richards (1981) who uncovered the basic relationships between income distribution
and redistributive policies. More recently, Benabou and Ok (2001) have modelled
the “prospect of upward mobility” (POUM) hypothesis. According to their model,
when redistributive policies cannot be changed too frequently there can be a range
of individuals with income below the mean who oppose such policies because they
rationally expect to be above the mean in the future, and the mass of people who
oppose redistribution can be a majority in the population.
Several empirical papers have tried to measure social mobility.5 The relation-
ship between social mobility and demand for redistribution is studied by Ravallion
and Lokshin (2000) on Russian data, Corneo and Gruner (2001) using an inter-
national survey on several OECD countries, and by Corneo (2000) for Germany
and the United States.6 All these papers use self-assessments measures of upward
mobility and conclude that the latter signi…cantly a¤ects attitudes towards redistri-
bution. Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999) found that intergenerational social
mobility is higher in the United States than in Italy, and redistributive policies are
more extensive in Italy than in the US. In a comparison of Sweden and the US,
Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) reach inconclusive results. Looking at British data
Gardiner and Hills (1999) …nd mixed evidence on the pattern of income mobility
in the U.K. and on whether these patterns can explain the types of redistributive
policies adopted. Gottschalk and Spolaore (2000) examine di¤erent measures of
mobility in Germany and the United States and they conclude that income mobil-
ity is higher in the United States. This holds especially for the middle class, which
4For extensive discussion and illustration of this point, see Gilens (1999) and Kinder and
Sanders (1996).
5For a survey and assessment of data problems see Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison
(1992).
6In the paper by Corneo and Gruner (2001), other motivations of the demand for redistribu-
tion, along with the political-economic channel, are taken into account, and the results are shown
to di¤er for Eastern European countries and for Western ones.
2is particularly important in any voting model where the position of the median
voter matters.
This paper di¤ers from the existing empirical literature in several respects.
First, while all existing studies relate an individual’s attitude towards redistribu-
tive policies to her own past experience of mobility (e.g., the individual’s edu-
cation, wealth, or social status compared to the parent’s), we also consider the
role of general mobility in society. In fact, someone who lives in a particularly
mobile environment may be convinced that she has good prospects of moving up
the income ladder regardless of whether this has already happened to her. For
t h i sp u r p o s e ,w em a t c ht h ei n f o r m a t i o nc o n t a i n e di nt h eG S Sw i t hr e p r e s e n t a t i v e
mobility measures at the national or state level constructed from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). In other words, while the existing literature has ei-
ther looked at the individual determinants of the demand for redistribution, or
assessed the extent of general mobility in the United States, we carry out both
e ¤ o r t sa tt h es a m et i m eb e c a u s ew eb e l i e v et h et w os i d e sc a n n o tb ed i s j o i n ti fw e
are trying to understand who wants redistributive policies and why. Secondly, we
do not rely on a generic measure of mobility, but rather we de…ne an index that
is as close as possible to what economic theory predicts should be the “rational”
measure to employ, either expected future income, or the likelihood moving above
a given income threshold –say the mean or the median– thus being a net loser from
redistribution. We test these measures against other indexes and …nd that they
have considerably more explanatory power. Thirdly, we investigate the interplay
between one’s perceptions about “equal opportunities” and the in‡uence of upward
mobility on the preference for redistribution: in fact, mobility per se is not enough
if some categories of individuals are systematically less likely to bene…t from it.
Finally, to our knowledge this is the …rst study on the determinants of preferences
for redistribution in the US using individual level data that span two decades, that
is the General Social Survey (GSS).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie‡y discusses the
determinants of the demand for redistributive policies. Section 3 presents our
empirical strategy and data. Section 4 illustrates our econometric results and the
last section concludes.
2 The demand for redistribution
Who is in favor of redistributive policies? First of all, current income should be a
good predictor of individual attitudes towards redistribution, in the sense that the
poor should be the main supporters of redistributive policies. The seminal work
by Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richards (1981) provides a useful benchmark.
In their framework a proportional tax on income is levied on individuals with
3di¤erent productivity, and the proceeds are redistributed in a lump sum manner.
The lower is the pre-tax income of an individual, the higher is her desired tax rate,
that is the extent of redistribution. Anybody with a pre-tax income above the
m e a nw o u l dv o t ef o raz e r ot a x ,b u ti ft h em e d i a ni sb e l o wt h em e a n ,t h em e d i a n
voter would choose a positive tax rate.7
Some of today’s poor may become rich tomorrow and –to the extent that
redistributive policies cannot be changed very frequently– they may oppose redis-
tributive schemes that, although advantageous today, may make them net losers
in the future. In other words, the prospect of upward mobility in‡uences pref-
erences for redistributive policies, under the reasonable assumption that once in
place these policies are relatively stable over time. Thus, in the context of the
“linear tax with lump sum redistribution” model discussed above, expected future
income, in addition to current income, should in‡uence the preference for the size
of redistribution.
In models à la Meltzer and Richards, particularly important is the mobility
of the voters close to the median, as a determinant of the equilibrium amount of
redistribution. In fact, Benabou and Ok (2000) show that there exists a range of
individuals with below-mean income who oppose redistribution if their expected
income is a concave function of today’s income. This concavity is reasonably
realistic: it implies that future income prospects are increasing in today’s income
but at a decreasing rate, a sort of decreasing return in opportunities.8
In reality, redistributive programs are more complex than those implied by the
linear tax schedule à la Meltzer and Richards. In particular, one can conceive
a political equilibrium in which a majority of voters –say, all those with income
below the median– choose to tax very heavily those above the median. In other
words, a majority of voters may choose a non linear redistributive scheme. In this
case, the probability of being above the relevant income threshold should be an in-
dicator of how social mobility in‡uences individual preferences for redistribution.9
In summary, measures of expected future income and chances of being above some
given income threshold (which depends on the nature of redistribution) should
7Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) apply these ideas to dynamic
models that link growth, income inequality and the equilibrium level of redistribution, but social
mobility plays no role because the relative ranking of individuals is invariant.
8This restriction would be satis…ed for instance in models with credit constraints in borrowing
to invest in education and decreasing returns on investment in human capital. See Benabou
(1996) for a survey of these types of models. Another assumption in Benabou and Ok’s analysis
is that redistributive policies cannot be changed too frequently. In fact, ceteris paribus, the longer
is the horizon for which redistributive schemes are …xed, the stronger the e¤ect of the POUM
hypothesis. This assumption of stickiness or “status quo bias” is also quite realistic. For models
exhibiting status quo bias see Fernandez and Rodrik (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
9An elementary example of this case is one in which the redistributive scheme implies a lump
sum tax on all those above the income threshold and a lump sum subsidy to all those below it.
4in‡uence individual preferences.
A third factor, beyond current income and mobility, should in‡uence attitudes
towards redistribution: risk aversion. In fact, for a given degree of mobility, more
risk-averse individuals should be more favorable to redistribution because they
weigh the possibility of moving below the mean more heavily. For su¢ciently
risk-averse individuals, even though today’s redistributive policies may bring a net
loss, they may constitute a desirable means of insuring against future downward
mobility.
Piketty (1995) emphasizes that individuals may not know their “true” chances
of being upwardly mobile and that, if learning it is costly, di¤erences of opinions
about redistribution will persist. From an empirical standpoint, this implies that
individuals may extract signals about their prospects of future mobility from their
own recent experience of upward (or downward) mobility. In other words, apart
from the opportunities that society objectively o¤ers (which are captured by rela-
tive upward mobility as discussed above), we can expect one’s personal history of
mobility to a¤ect views about the desirability of redistributive policies.
Even wealthy individuals may be in favor of redistribution purely for a sense
of altruism, if they see redistributive policies as a substitute to charity. A related
point is that observing poverty may have a negative e¤ect on individuals’s utility,
therefore to some extent rich voters may favor policies that make them net losers on
the income front but increase their overall utility by reducing observed poverty.10
Finally, in a land of equal opportunities redistributive policies may be seen as
unnecessary in the presence of mobility. On the other hand, if someone believes
that family background or other exogenous factors unduly in‡uence one’s position
in the income ladder, this person may favor redistribution regardless of her wealth
or mobility prospects, simply to correct for “unfair advantages.” In fact, for those
who believe that opportunities are not really equal, then upward mobility is not
an unbiased index of individual success. People with these beliefs may want the
government to engage in policies that help the least successful, perhaps precisely to
correct the bias or “market failure” that occurs in the social rat race. In this case,
one cannot see the “biased” social mobility as an alternative to redistribution.
In summary, theory identi…es: a) current income; b) measures of income mo-
bility; c) risk aversion; d) personal history of income mobility; e) altruism; and f)
beliefs in the existence of equal opportunities for all, as variables that should in‡u-
ence people’s preferences concerning government redistributive policies. In what
follows we test the signi…cance of these di¤erent channels.
10It is also true that observed poverty may have the opposite e¤ect: for somebody who works,
the observation of many people who live on welfare may convey the impression of being “ex-
ploited” and increase aversion to redistributive policies (see Luttmer (1997) for evidence on the
latter point).
53 Empirical strategy and data
In our baseline speci…cation, we assume that the support for redistribution of
individual i living in state s at time t can be characterized by a “latent variable”:
Y
¤
ist = Xist¯ + Mist° + S¸+ T»+ "ist (1)
where Xist is a vector of individual characteristics such as age, education, etc.,
which also includes proxies for risk aversion and altruism; Mist is a dummy cap-
turing the individual’s personal history of mobility; S is a vector of state dummies;
T is a vector of year dummies, and "ist is an error term. The vectors ¯;°; ¸; and
» are parameters.
We do not observe Y ¤
ist but a variable Yist taking values 1 to 7 increasing in
individual support for redistribution. In particular, we have
Yist =1 if Y ¤
ist · ¹1
Yist =2 if ¹1 <Y¤
ist · ¹2
:::
Yist =7 if ¹6 <Y¤
ist · ¹7
(2)
where ¹1;:::;¹7 are unknown parameters to be estimated with ¯;°; ¸; and ».A s -
suming that the distribution of the error term is logistic, we estimate an ordered
logit model. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the magnitude of the coe¢-
cients, we also collapse the dependent variable into a binary variable taking value
1 (support redistribution) if Yist > 4, and 0 (not support) if Yist · 4.
We begin by estimating our model using individual level data to assess the
relative size and signi…cance of the vector of coe¢cients ¯ (capturing various de-
terminants of preferences) and of ° (capturing the mobility experienced by the
individual). Section 4.1 describes the results of this procedure.
We next move to study the prospects of future mobility that the individual
may face. In order to do this, we use a long panel to construct indexes of expected
income and of upward mobility which vary by state or by year for each decile of the
income distribution. We then identify the decile to which each individual belongs
and match the individual with the appropriate mobility index. In terms of the
above speci…cation, this amounts to replacing (1) with:
Y
d¤
ist = Xist¯ + Mist° + R
d
st± + S¸+ T»+ "ist (3)
where d indicates the decile to which individual i belongs, and Rd
st is the relative
upward mobility index for the dth decile at time t in state s: In most of our empiri-
cal analysis, we will not employ an index that is time and state-varying at the same
time, because this would not leave us with enough observations in the transition
6matrix to construct a meaningful measure. In other words, we will employ alter-
natively Rd
t and Rd
s. For the same reason, we cannot construct transition matrices
for geographical units smaller than a state. Section 4.2 describes these results.
Finally, we are interested in understanding whether perceptions of fairness
a¤ect how individual preferences respond to increased upward mobility. For ex-
ample, we may conjecture that if one believes that society does not o¤er equal
opportunities to all, this person may desire redistribution regardless of the extent
of mobility, while if one believes that the game is fair she may want less redistribu-
tion when mobility increases. In order to investigate these e¤ects, we modify the
speci…cation in (3) as follows:
Y
d¤
ist = Xist¯ + Mist° + R
d
stDist±
E + R
d
st(1 ¡ Dist)±
U + S¸+ T»+ "ist (4)
where Dist is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent believes in “equal opportu-
nities” and 0 otherwise. The coe¢cient ±
E captures the role of social mobility
for those who believe that society o¤ers “equal opportunities”, and ±
U for those
who think that opportunities are unequal. If the above conjecture is correct, we
should observe that ±
E and ±
U are signi…cantly di¤erent, and in particular that
±
E is lower (i.e., more negative) than ±
U. This test is also interesting because it
captures a variation across individuals with di¤erent beliefs on equal opportunities
within the same income decile and the same state or year, hence it helps addressing
potential concerns of spurious correlation between upward mobility and attitudes
towards redistribution in the cross-section. Section 4.3 describes these results.
The data for our regressions come from two main sources. The …rst is the Gen-
eral Social Survey (from now on, GSS), which since 1974 has interviewed about
1,500 individuals every year from a nationally representative sample, asking ques-
tions on individual socio-economic background, but especially on preferences and
attitudes towards social and political issues. From this source we draw our depen-
dent variable, which is the response to a question concerning whether “the gov-
ernment should reduce income di¤erences between the rich and the poor.” We
also draw all the individual controls such as age, sex, education, personal history
of mobility, beliefs on fairness, etc. Our …nal sample covers the years 1978-1991.11
De…nitions and summary statistics of all variables are provided in the Appendix.
11The years before 1978 cannot be used because the question identifying our dependent vari-
ables was not asked. The survey was not conducted in 1979, 1981, and 1992. Our regressions
do not include the years from 1993 onwards because we are restricted by the data availability
in the other dataset we use, namely the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In fact, the
“…nal release” PSID dataset ends in 1993, and the individuals interviewed in that year are asked
questions about their income in 1992, which means that we can only build a social mobility index
up to 1992. For detailed information about the GSS, the reader is referred to Davis and Smith
(1994).
7The second data source is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (from now on,
PSID). This very well known study contains longitudinal data on a representative
sample of US individuals from 1968 to nowadays. The initial sample of 5,000
respondents has been interviewed every year, and members of each household have
been followed in the new households they may have formed, so that the sample has
grown to over 50,000 in recent years. The crucial aspect for our purposes is that
the panel nature of the study allows us to follow over time the earnings pro…le of a
fairly large set of individuals, and to construct intragenerational mobility indexes
for US states over the sample period or for the US as a whole each year.
We use income variables for the period 1968-93. We measure mobility within
any two consecutive years in this period, but we also explore longer horizons for
our mobility measure. As for the de…nition of income, our benchmark speci…cation
employs total family income measured by the PSID variable “total taxable income
of Head and Wife”. This would seem the most appropriate variable, since taxes
are levied on this measure of income and many transfer programs are related to
it. In any event, we check robustness using alternative measures of income, such
as family income including other family members, and earnings of the household
head (see below for a detailed description).
3.1 Measuring mobility
The …rst notion of mobility we are interested in relates to the history of personal
mobility experienced by the individual. Starting from GSS data we can construct
two measures. The …rst captures the individual’s status in terms of job prestige,
and is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has a higher “occupational prestige
score” than his father’s.12 The second measure relates to educational attainment
and is the di¤erence between the years of education of the respondent and those
of the father.
As for social mobility several considerations guided our choice. First of all,
unless we assume generational altruism in the utility function, an individual’s
support for redistributive policies should respond to the prospects of mobility faced
by the individual herself and not by her children. In addition, if one estimates the
i n t e r v a lb e t w e e nt w og e n e r a t i o n st ob e2 5t o3 0y e a r s ,i ti su n l i k e l yt oe x p e c t
that policies voted upon today will necessarily be in place 30 years from now.
This further restricts our attention to measures of intragenerational,a so p p o s e dt o
intergenerational, mobility. Also, we choose to discretize the distribution of income
a n dt h e nl o o ka tt h etransition matrix between one income category and the other,
in order to get mobility measures that are robust to possible data contamination
12For a detailed discussion of the GSS occupational prestige scores, the reader is referred to
Nakao et al. (1990a,b).
8(see Cowell and Schluter (1998) on this point).
[Insert Table 1]
Table 1 shows the average yearly transition matrix between income deciles
(measured on family income) for the United States in the period 1967-92.13 The
…gures in each cell represent “transition probabilities”, that is, pij in row i and
column j is the probability that an individual whose family income is in the ith
decile in year t will move to the jth decile in year (t +1 ) .14 The elements on the
principal diagonal contain the probabilities that someone stays in the same decile,
i.e. is “immobile”. Immobility de…ned in this sense is highest at the extremes
and decreases monotonically from the extreme deciles towards the 4th and 5th
deciles.15 In other words, the “American dream” does not hold for everyone. For
instance, individuals whose family income is in the 1st decile have a 40 percent
probability of moving to a higher decile, and half of this probability refers to
moving to the 2nd decile only. Individuals who start today from the 3rd decile
have a 66 percent probability of being in the 3rd or in lower deciles next year, and
34 percent of moving upwards. Conversely, for individuals in the 10th decile of
the earnings distribution the total probability of moving below the 9th is less than
10 percent. People in the intermediate deciles have a relatively high likelihood of
moving upwards or downwards.
[Insert Table 2]
Table 2 shows a similar matrix, but calculated on a 5 year interval rather than
between two consecutive years. Note that, as expected, the elements of the diagonal
are signi…cantly smaller in this matrix relative to those in Table 1. Income mobility
increases with the time span on which it is calculated. An interesting comparison
is that between the two contiguous cells to each diagonal element (to the right and
to the left) in table 1 and in table 2. This comparison shows that when we consider
mobility between from one year to the next, the probability of staying in the same
decile is almost twice that of moving one decile up or down; on the other hand,
when we look at …ve-year mobility the gap reduces signi…cantly and the likelihood
13The original PSID data are for the years 1968 to 1993, but interviews in a given year refer
to incomes earned during the previous year.
14Notice that table 1 is reported for expositional convenience, but will not be employed in the
econometric analysis. In fact, each value in table 1 is the average of the values in the corresponding
cells from 25 separate matrices (one for every couple of consecutive years starting from 1967/68
until 1991/92). In our regressions we will refer to the original time-varying matrixes and match
them with the relevant year for each GSS respondent.
15Notice that for the 1st and 10th decile the high values on the principal diagonal partly re‡ect
a “truncation” e¤ect: mobility in one direction is in fact impossible by de…nition.
9of moving one decile up or down for people in intermediate deciles (say the …fth
or the sixth) is roughly 3 percentage points less than that of being immobile.
Following our previous discussion on the determinants of preferences for re-
distribution we employ two measures of mobility. One is expected future income,
de…ned as follows
EXPINCd;(t¡1) =
10 X
j=1
pdjyj;t (5)
Expression (5) represents the income that an individual who is in decile d at time
t ¡ 1 can expect to have at time t; and is a weighted average of the mean income
of all deciles in year t (i.e., yj;t) where the weights are the probabilities that the
individual has to move to those deciles from t ¡ 1 to t (i.e., pdj). We will also
experiment with a similar index constructed for a …ve-year time span.
Our second measure of mobility isolates the probability that the respondent
will have a “relatively high” income in the future and bear a “relatively heavy”
redistributive burden. We de…ne the following index of “relative mobility”:
RELMOBJd =
10 X
i=J
pdj (6)
Expression (6) is the probability that an individual whose current income is in
decile d will move to deciles greater or equal to J in the future. In the empirical
work we set J =7to capture roughly the probability of being above mean income
(in fact, in our PSID sample mean income generally falls in the 6th decile or at
the boundary between the 6th and the 7th), but we also experiment with di¤erent
income thresholds. We denote this as an index of “relative” mobility because it
captures the chances of being in certain positions of the income ladder relative to a
given threshold. Strictly speaking, this index captures “upward mobility” for those
individuals who start from a decile below J, but can be associated with immobility
or even downward mobility for individuals in the top income deciles. However, our
goal is not to construct a general mobility measure, but one that is related to the
likelihood that the individual will lose or bene…t from redistribution.
Knowing the decile to which each GSS respondent belongs, we can match her
with the corresponding value for, say, RELMOB7d in two alternative ways. The
…rst to opt for a “local” notion of mobility and say that an individual’s preferences
respond to the average degree of mobility of her decile in the State where she lives.
In other words, we can compute a State-speci…c RELMOB7s
d from a transition
matrix that is constructed pooling all the PSID respondents who lived in State
s during any two consecutive years between 1967 and 1992.16 Due to the sample
16For the purpose of building State-speci…c transition matrices, each individual in the PSID is
10size, it is not possible to construct meaningful transition matrixes for di¤erent
years within a State, nor for any geographical area smaller than a State. The
second option is to use a time-varying index, say RELMOB7t
d; which amounts to
computing RELMOB7d for the entire US in every year between 1967 and 1992,
and assign to each GSS respondent the index for the year before the one in which
the individual expresses an opinion about redistribution. Analogously, we can
construct a State-varying and a time-varying measure of expected future income.
[Insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 shows the distribution across States of our “relative mobility” index
for the median income decile, i.e. RELMOB7s
5 . N o t et h a tw h e nw eh a v el e s s
than one hundred individuals matching the criteria for the State-speci…c transition
matrix in the PSID, we report the index as missing.17 Generally speaking, the
W e s ta p p e a r sa sm o r e“ m o b i l e ”t h a nt h eE a s t .
[Insert Figure 2]
Figure 2 shows the time series of our measures of expected income and of rela-
tive mobility for the median decile, i.e. RELMOB7t
5 (top panel) and EXPINCt
5
(bottom panel). Not surprisingly, expected income is highly correlated with the
business cycle. Relative mobility is not correlated with it.18 Obviously, in all re-
gressions we shall control for the actual income of the respondent, and for the cycle
using time dummies.
In our empirical analysis, we shall also test whether individuals respond to
measures of mobility that are less closely linked to the notion of relative gains
and losses from redistribution. For example, we shall test whether preferences
for redistribution are in‡uenced by the mobility index proposed by Fields and Ok
(1996a):
(Fields¡ Ok)st =
N X
i=1
1
N
¯ ¯ ¯y
i
s;t+1 ¡ y
i
s;t
¯ ¯ ¯ (7)
counted for the State in which she lived in the second of any two consecutive years. For those
who have changed State over the sample period, we have tried dropping them for the sample
in the year in which the migration occurred, instead of retaining them with the criterion of the
second year explained above (which amounts to attributing their mobility to the State of arrival).
None of our results was a¤ected.
17The states for which this occurs are Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota and New
Hampshire.
18The variability of RELMOB7t
5 over time may be related to job turnover. Forn an analysis
of wage mobility between and within jobs see Gottschalk (2000).
11where yi
t is individual i’s income in State s at time t and N is the total number of
individuals. An analogous formula can be used substituting the logarithm for the
level of income. Broadly speaking, the index (7) captures the aggregate amount of
income shifts in a State between one year and the following one, without conveying
any information on whether the rank of individuals above and below the mean has
changed.
Another general index of mobility can be constructed starting from the Spear-
man’s rank correlation coe¢cient.19 In particular, we de…ne the following index:
(Spearman mobility)st =1¡ ½st (8)
where ½st is the Spearman correlation coe¢cient for State s in year t, i.e. it
captures the correlation between an individual’s rank in the income scale in year
t¡1 a n dt h a ti ny e a rt; within a given State.20 Though compared to (7) the index
(8) does convey information on re-ranking among individual incomes, it does not
link mobility to any criterion for losing or gaining from redistribution, hence we
expect it to have low explanatory power in our regressions compared to expected
income and to our “relative mobility” measure.
Finally, we construct a normative index of social mobility as suggested by King
(1983). Let N be the number of individuals living in State s at time t; and denote
by yi the income of individual i and by y the mean income in the State. One can
evaluate changes in the ranking of individuals between t ¡ 1 and t in terms of the
following scaled order statistic
ri =
jyi;t ¡ yi;t¡1j
y
:
Clearly, ri will assume a positive value when an individual rank changes, and 0
when it is unchanged. The index of mobility proposed by King builds on the above
statistic and has the following expression:
Kingst =1 ¡
"P
i (yiexp(°ri))
k
P
i yk
i
#¡1=k
for k 6=0 (9)
=1 ¡ exp
Ã
¡
°
N
X
i
ri
!
for k =0
19For a thorough discussion of orderings in two-way contingency tables, see Dardanoni and
Forcina (1998).
20Notice that, since neither the Fields-Ok index nor that based on the Spearman coe¢cient are
constructed from inter-decile transition matrices, we have anough observations to build mobility
indexes that are state and time varying at the same time.
12where ° ¸ 0 is the degree of immobility aversion (higher ° means more aversion to
immobility) and k · 1 parameterizes the preference for ‘vertical’ inequality (the
higher is (1 ¡ k); the higher is aversion to inequality).21 A si nt h ec a s eo ft h e
Fields-Ok and the Spearman mobility index, King’s measure is not closely linked
to the relative gains and losses from redistributive taxation, hence we expect it
to have low explanatory power in regressions that focus on the political-economic
determinants of preferences for redistribution.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Before estimating the e¤ect of di¤erent notions of mobility through multivariate
analysis, in Table 3 we report some descriptive statistics.
[Insert Table 3]
Our dependent variable is derived from a GSS question asking whether “the
government should reduce income di¤erences between the rich and the poor, per-
haps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the
poor”. The respondent could choose on a 1 to 7 scale from “should not” (1) to
“should” (7).22 In what follows we use the entire scale in our ordered logit regres-
sions. We also transformed this variable into a binary one coding as 1 (favorable
to redistribution) those who gave a score of 5 to 7 in the above question, and
coding as 0 (averse to redistribution) the others. We labelled this binary variable
GOV RED. As we can see from Table 3, this classi…cation breaks the respondents
a l m o s te x a c t l yi na… f t y - … f t ys p l i t . 23
This GSS question is quite appropriate for our purposes. In fact it captures
the general attitude of the respondent toward the actual redistributive role of
government, which is precisely what we are interested in. It also makes clear in
its formulation that redistributive policies imply higher taxes on wealthier families
and more generous transfers to poorer ones.
Table 3 shows the pattern of the answer to this question over time and across
regions. The last column seems to suggest that, when we look at the fraction of
people with relatively strong preferences in favor of redistribution, this fraction in-
creased from the mid-eighties until the beginning of the nineties, and then started
21King (1983) uses the term ‘vertical equity’ to refer to the distribution of welfare levels and
‘horizontal equity’ to refer to the ranking of individuals within the distribution.
22More precisely, the scores in the original GSS question were reversed, 1 being the most
favorable to redistribution and 7 the least. We have rescaled the variable so that it is increasing
in one’s support for redistributive policies.
23In the empirical section, we also experimented with dropping those individuals who gave a
score of 4 (i.e., those with mild preferences or undecided), and none of our results were a¤ected.
13to decrease.24 As for the regional dimension of this variable, support for redistri-
bution is lower in the South and in the West, and higher in the North-East and
Midwest. If we relate this with Figure 1 above, it would appear that regions with
more mobility display a higher aversion to redistribution. Note also an obvious
correlation with voting patterns, in which liberal/Democratic states tend to be in
the North East while the South and West are more conservative/Republican.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Preferences for redistribution
Table 4 reports the coe¢cients of our ordered logit regressions on the individual
determinants of preferences for redistribution. In all regressions, standard errors
are adjusted for clustering of the residuals at the MSA level. All speci…cations
include state and year dummies (not shown). The di¤erent number of observations
is due to di¤erent coverage of the GSS for the various questions. In this table, we
u s ea l lt h ea v a i l a b l eo b s e r v a t i o n si ne v e r yr e g r e s s i o n .
[Insert Table 4]
Not surprisingly, current income matters: wealthier individuals look less favor-
ably to redistribution. Several other individual characteristics are signi…cant. For
example, women and blacks are more supportive of redistributive policies. More
educated individuals are instead less favorable, even after controlling for income.
Age, marital status and the presence of children do not signi…cantly a¤ect the
preferences and for redistribution. On the other hand, religious a¢liation seems
to have limited in‡uence: the coe¢cient on Protestants is negative and borderline
insigni…cant, that on Catholic and Jewish is insigni…cant, and that on “other”
religions is positive and signi…cant (the omitted category is “no religion”).
Let us now turn to risk aversion. Unfortunately, the GSS does not contain any
question that would allow us to directly measure it (e.g., information on gambling
or on willingness to pay for lotteries). We are thus forced to rely on proxies. The
…rst proxy we consider is self-employment: self-employed individuals may be so
because they are more prone to take risks. Our results show that self-employed
people are much more averse to redistribution even after controlling for income
and all other individual characteristics, possibly because they do not value too
highly the “insurance” against negative income shocks provided by redistributive
programs. Of course, an alternative explanation of this …nding may be that the
24Note the sharp drop in 1994 relative to 1993. However, we end our sample at 1993, since
we cannot construct the income mobility variable for 1994.
14self-employed bene…t less from various government programs. Also, self employed
individuals may have chosen this type of job because they have a more ”individu-
alistic” culture, thus more favorable to a self made person ”culture”.
Having experienced unemployment in the last few years may both increase risk
aversion and directly a¤ect one’s view of redistributive policies. For example, a
spell of unemployment can be interpreted as a “learning experience”, in the sense
that by becoming unemployed the respondent may have learned about her need for
government intervention and become more sensitive to the risk of future spells of
unemployment. The dummy for whether the respondent has been unemployed in
the last …ve years takes a positive and signi…cant coe¢cient. The interpretation of
unemployment as a¤ecting risk aversion is in part supported by the fact that when
we use a relative’s unemployment experience (as opposed to the respondent’s own
experience), this variable remains signi…cant at the 5 percent level. This result
is also encouraging because a relative’s unemployment status is less prone to be
endogenous to the respondent’s preferences about redistribution. Not surprisingly,
though, the respondent’s own experience has a larger e¤ect on her views than a
relative’s experience.25
In the next column, we introduce the variable “Help others” to capture the idea
that support for redistribution may be due to a sense of altruism. This variable
identi…es the respondents who answer yes to the question of whether children
should be taught that helping others is the most important moral value. This
variable has a positive and signi…cant coe¢cient.26
In column (4) we add two measures of personal mobility. The …rst one is a
dummy for whether the respondent’s “job prestige” is higher than the father’s.
The second is the di¤erence between the years of education of the respondent and
that of his father. The results are mixed: the prestige variable has a signi…cant co-
e¢cient with the expected (negative) sign: people whose job is more “prestigious”
than their father’s look less favorably to redistributive policies. On the other hand,
the coe¢cient education gap has the opposite sign of what we would expect. This
may be due to the fact that the widespread trend of increasing education between
generations does not make this variable a meaningful indicator of mobility.
In the last column we report the marginal coe¢cients from a probit regression
in which the left hand side variable is the binary variable GOV RED, discussed
above. This helps interpret the magnitude of several coe¢cients in a more straight-
forward way. One of the most striking results is the very large coe¢cient on the
25All these results are available upon request.
26>From the same GSS question we have also constructed a dummy for whether helping others
is one of the two most important moral values to be transmitted to children. The number of
positive answers to this question is very large, however, making it of little signi…cance for our
purposes. Results obtained using this variable are consistent with those shown in Table 3.
15variable Black. This coe¢cient is more than twice as large (in absolute terms)
than that on the respondent’s unemployment experience. It is almost three times
as large than that on women and it is larger than the di¤erence in preferences
between the maximum and the minimum level of education. Though not direct
evidence on the interaction between redistribution and racial con‡icts, our result
that blacks are signi…cantly more favorable to redistribution is consistent with a
vast literature on the subject, as well documented by Gilens (1999) amongst others.
According to this literature, wealthy whites are especially averse to redistributive
policies if they perceive that the bene…ciaries are members of racial minorities.
Direct evidence on this point is provided by Poterba (1997) and Alesina, Baqir
and Easterly (1999). The former shows that elderly white voters are particularly
adverse to public spending on education in communities where a large fraction
of children are from minority groups. The latter paper shows that a measure of
racial fragmentation is inversely related to welfare spending in United States cities,
counties and metropolitan areas.
We next turn to the variables which are the main focus of our investigation.
4.2 Social mobility
In the …rst four columns of Table 5 we add to the basic speci…cation of column
4 in table 4 our measures of social mobility (5) and (6), computed by state on
the entire sample.27 Both the probability of being above the 6th decile and the
expected future income negatively in‡uence individual support for redistribution,
and these e¤ects are signi…cant at the 1 percent level. The coe¢cients on the
individual controls remain basically unchanged relative to the previous table.
[Insert Table 5]
Again, for the sake of exposition, the last two columns of table 5 report
marginal probit coe¢cients for the speci…cation in which the dependent variable is
the binary one, GOV RED: A c c o r d i n gt oo u re s t i m a t e s ,ac h a n g ei nRELMOB7
from the mean for the …rst decile to the mean for the tenth decile reduces the
propensity to favor redistribution by 6.5 percentage points. This e¤ect is almost
the same order of magnitude of being self-employed, it is larger than the e¤ect
of being female, and is slightly less than half the e¤ect of being black. Looking
at expected income, an increase of expected income from the mean for the lowest
to the mean for the highest decile reduces the support for redistribution by 12
percentage points, which is almost as large as the e¤ect of being black and almost
twice the e¤ect of having been recently unemployed.
27In these regressions we drop the “help others” variable and the religious variables because
they would restrict signi…cantly the number of available observations.
16[Insert Table 6]
In Table 6 we perform some sensitivity analysis. Individual controls, state and
year dummies are included in the regressions, though not shown in the table. Each
cell refers to a separate regression in which the speci…cation is that of column 1
and column 2 of table 5, respectively, for the …rst and second row of coe¢cients
in table 6. The …rst column of table 6 excludes the in‡uential observations using
the DFbeta method.28 Both the coe¢cient on RELMOB7 and that on expected
income remain negative and highly signi…cant. In the second column we modify
our construction of the mobility indexes dropping from the PSID sample the ob-
servations relative to individuals who changed state of residence from one year
to the next. Again, the results are unchanged compared to table 5. In the third
column we test for nonlinear e¤ects of income by adding a set of dummies for the
decile to which the respondent belongs, in addition to controlling for individual
income. Our mobility index based on probabilities remains negative and highly
signi…cant, while expected income becomes insigni…cant, possibly because of the
high correlation between this variable, actual income, and income deciles. In col-
umn 4 we address the issue of noise in year-to-year variation in incomes by using
a three-year average instead of a point level income …gure. In other words, when
constructing mobility matrixes in the PSID, the income of a respondent in year
t is replaced by her average income in t ¡ 1;tand t ¡ 1: This obviously leads to
a smaller sample size in the PSID, but the results in our regressions are virtually
unchanged. Finally, in the …fth column of table 6 we employ mobility measures
computed by decile for the whole US that vary year by year. Again, our results
are robust to considering the time variation in mobility across deciles rather than
the cross-State variation.
We have also experimented with di¤erent income thresholds for our “relative
mobility” index. In particular, we have computed the index (6) looking at the
probability of moving to deciles 6 to 10 (RELMOB6)o r5t o1 0( RELMOB5).
While the former has a coe¢cient which is borderline (in)signi…cant at standard
con…dence levels,. the latter has an insigni…cant coe¢cient. These results are
comforting, since they display a monotonically declining level of signi…cance as we
move the threshold lower and lower. It would appear that the threshold that makes
respondents signi…cantly averse to redistribution lies somewhere between the sixth
and the seventh decile. This is close to the mean income of the population, and
probably not much higher than the average income of the electorate, since voters’
participation is positively correlated with income.
28We calculate the DFbetas from each original regression and drop those observations that
lead to signi…cant changes in the coe¢cients of our mobility indexes. Precisely, we drop those
observations for which abs(DFbeta) > 2=
p
#obs (see e.g., Belsley et al. (1980), p.28).
17[Insert Table 7]
In Table 7 we pursue additional sensitivity analysis, by experimenting with
di¤erent de…nitions of income and time horizons. Again, each coe¢cient in the
table is from a separate regression. Column 1 uses family income as de…ned above,
looking at a …ve year horizon to compute mobility. The second and third columns
use mobility measures constructed from the hourly earnings of the head of the
household, for both the one year and …ve year time horizon. The idea is that,
while changes in total taxable income may re‡ect changes in the number of hours
worked rather than in ‘status’, changes in individual hourly earnings are likely to
re‡ect an improvement or a deterioration of job status. We can see from the table
that the higher the prospects of upward mobility de…ned in this sense, the lower is
the support for redistribution, consistently with what we found so far. Finally, in
the last two columns we broaden the de…nition of family income by including in the
computation of total taxable income all “other family unit members” (OFUMs)
together with head and spouse. Our results remain virtually unchanged.
[Insert Table 8]
In Table 8 we consider other measures of mobility that di¤er from our indexes
RELMOB7 and expected income in that they capture mobility in a way that is
not directly related to the chances of being a winner or loser from redistribution
in the near future. These measures are the Fields-Ok index (7), the Spearman
mobility index (8), and King’s index (9) with parameters ° =1and k = ¡0:1.29
We compute them both for the one-year and for the …ve-years time horizon. Inter-
estingly, none of these coe¢cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero (Fields-Ok
computed with logarithms is signi…cant only at the 10 percent level). This result
is encouraging, because it highlights that not any measure of mobility “works.”
Measures that seem to work are the ones more directly related to expected future
income and to the probability of being in the upper deciles, that is, above median
and average income. This is consistent with the interpretation that the people
who oppose redistribution more are those that are afraid to “loose” in the future,
rather than those that are generically “mobile.”
29There is no clear criterion for choosing parameter values for King’s index, and we don’t
know of any study that has implemented this index empirically. We have computed it for a
b r o a dr a n g eo fp a r a m e t e r sa n dt h e nc h o s e nw h a ts e e m e dt ob e‘ a v e r a g e ’v a l u e s ,n o tt o ob i a s e di n
favor or against immobility and inequality. The parameterization used in table 8 can be thought
of as ‘average’ aversion to immobility and to inequality; then we have estimated the model for
° =0 :5 and k =0 :2 (low aversion to immobility and inequality) and for ° =2and k = ¡2 (high
aversion). None of the coe¢cients was signi…cant.
184.3 Equal opportunities
The …nal point we want to address is how individual preferences respond to in-
creased mobility when the mobility process is regarded as ‘biased’ or ‘unbiased’.
The GSS contains several questions regarding whether family background matters
for success, and more generally whether there are equal opportunities in society.
Unfortunately these questions were asked only in 1984, so the sample size is sig-
ni…cantly reduced compared to the above estimates. We try to compensate for the
small sample size by exploring robustness using as many questions as possible on
this topic.
[Insert Table 9]
The …rst column in table 9 identi…es the question asked, questions which cap-
ture the respondent’s attitude about “fairness” in society’s social ladder. The
second column shows how the responses are split in these yes/no questions. Gen-
erally, the split is very close to the middle, with a couple of exceptions. The next
two columns report the coe¢cients on one of our measures of “mobility,” namely
expected income, for those who answered yes and for those who answered no to
the question.30 Results are similar when we use RELMOB7. Our conjecture is
that those who believe in equal opportunities should be more (negatively) a¤ected
by the extent of relative upward mobility in their support for redistribution.
The results in table 9 provide considerable support for this conjecture. In 8
out of 11 answers the di¤erence in the coe¢cients on mobility between those who
are on the two sides of the question are statistically signi…cant with a p-value of
0.05 or less. Di¤erent responses point consistently in the same direction: those
who think that opportunities are really “equal” see social mobility as a substitute
for redistribution, the others do not. Take, for instance, question 7. People
who believe that everyone has an opportunity to receive an education display a
statistically signi…cant negative coe¢cient on expected income: they see upward
mobility as the result of a “fair game” and when their future income prospects are
higher they demand less redistribution. On the other hand, for those who think that
not everyone has a chance of receiving an education, the coe¢cient on expected
income is not statistically di¤erent from zero. For these individuals, higher mobility
does not necessarily translate into higher future income, hence their preferences for
redistribution is una¤ected. Turning to question 2, those who believe that class
di¤erences are due to family background are not sensitive to social mobility in
their views about redistribution, while those who believe that family background
30Going back to our empirical strategy, we are estimating the parameters ±
E and ±
U in ex-
pression (4), except that the time dummies are not included because we only have data for one
year.
19does not matter are more likely to oppose redistribution when mobility increases
(the coe¢cient under the “No” column is negative and signi…cant). Similarly, the
probability of favoring redistributive policies is negatively a¤ected by expected
income for those individuals who think that class di¤erences are due to ability and
education or that they are justi…ed (see the coe¢cients under the “Yes” column in
lines 1 and 5), but not for those who believe otherwise. Analogous considerations
apply to the other questions.
Overall, Table 9 suggests that, if an individual believes in equal opportunities,
then an increase in expected income makes her more averse to redistribution. But
if one believes that the outcome of social mobility is heavily in‡uenced by family
background or other exogenous factors, then attitudes towards redistribution are
much less in‡uenced by the degree of social mobility, since the latter is perceived
as “biased.”
5 Conclusions
The less wealthy should favor redistributive policies. However, people take into
account the fact that social mobility may make some of today’s “poor” into to-
morrow’s “rich”. We estimate the determinants of individual preferences for redis-
tribution and …nd that they re‡ect these intertemporal considerations. In fact, an
individual’s support for redistributive policies is negatively a¤ected by expected
future income and by the likelihood of moving above an income threshold that
separates the winners and the losers from redistribution. On the other hand, atti-
tudes toward redistribution are not a¤ected by generic measures of mobility that
do not capture well the relative gains and losses from future redistributive policies.
We also con…rm a “racial e¤ect” well known in the literature: after controlling for
many individual characteristics, including income, education, etc., whites are more
averse to redistribution than blacks.
We …nd that the people who are most opposed to government intervention in
distributive matters are those who believe that the social “rat race” is fair, that is,
everyone has the same opportunities to move up in life. In fact, these individuals
feel that the higher is social mobility, the less the government should redistribute:
if mobility is high, and everybody can take advantage of it, then the market works
as a determinant of the distribution of income and the government should not …ddle
with it. On the contrary, those who believe that opportunities are not equal for all,
so that income inequality implies also inequality in opportunities, do not believe
that social mobility is a substitute for government intervention in redistributive
matters.
Our results suggests that to some extent the public sees substitutability be-
tween o¤ering equal opportunities and equalizing outcomes, but that the degree of
20substitutability depends on the “rules of the game”. This may have relevant policy
implications when evaluating the desirability of redistributive policies. While on
the one hand such policies require complex tax/transfer schemes with well known
distortionary e¤ects, on the other hand they are perceived as a desirable means of
providing more equal opportunities when the social mobility process is not regarded
as fair.
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24Appendix
Data sources and coverage
The data sources are abbreviated as follows: GSS stands for “General Social Sur-
vey, cumulative …le 1972-94”; PSID refers to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
individual or family …les, downloaded from http://www.isr.umich.edu/src/psid/.
In all cases, “no answer”, “do not know”, “no opinion”, and “not applicable” were
coded as missing values.
The PSID sample we use is restricted to household heads aged 21-59 between
any two consecutive years in the period 1968-93. For these individuals we employ
t h r e ed e … n i t i o n so fi n c o m e ,l a b e l l e di nt h eP S I Da s :
a) Total taxable income of Head and Wife
b) Total taxable income of Head and Wife, including Other Family Unit Mem-
bers (OFUM)
c) Average hourly earnings of Head
De…nitions a) and b) include both labor income (labor part of farm income,
labor part of business income, wages, bonuses, overtime, commissions, income from
professional practice or trade, labor part of market gardening income, labor part of
roomers and boarders income), and income from assets (asset part of farm income,
asset part of unincorporated business income, asset part of market gardening, asset
part of income from roomers and boarders, alimony, income from rent, interest,
dividends, etc.). De…nition c) includes labor income of Head, and takes value zero
if Head did not work for money.
For all three income de…nitions we construct inter-deciles transition matrices
over a 1-year and a 5-year interval, i.e. we look at the decile to which the income
of the Head (or of the Head’s family) belongs between t and t +1 ; or between t
and t +5 ; respectively. Starting from these matrices, we construct the mobility
measures de…ned in the text. These indices take on di¤erent values depending on
the decile to which the individual belongs in year t: We therefore need to assign
our GSS respondents to the appropriate decile in the PSID.
The matching between GSS and PSID data is done as follows. For each GSS
respondent in any give year t we know both the respondent’s own “earnings, before
taxes” (GSS variable: ‘RINCOME’) and the “total family income, from all sources,
before taxes” (GSS variable: ‘INCOME’). For each transition matrix constructed
in the PSID from t to t +1we know the thresholds of each decile by row, i.e. the
minimum and maximum incomes of the individuals belonging to a given decile in
year t: We assign each GSS respondent to the appropriate decile by comparing
INCOME to the thresholds of the transition matrices constructed from family
income –de…nitions a) and b) above– and RINCOME to the thresholds of the
25transition matrices constructed from individual earnings –de…nition c).31
Variable de…nition
The following is a list of the variables we use and of their sources, followed by
summary statistics. Unless otherwise stated, the source of a variable is authors’
calculation on GSS data.
Support for redistribution: Categorical variable varying on a 7 point scale
from 1=against redistribution to 7=in favor of redistribution. Original GSS survey
question: “Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce
t h ei n c o m ed i ¤ e r e n c e sb e t w e e nt h er i c ha n dt h ep o o r ,p e r h a p sb yr a i s i n gt h et a x e s
of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that
the government should not concern itself with reducing this income di¤erence be-
tween the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of
a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income di¤er-
ences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should
not concern itself with reducing income di¤erences. What score between 1 and 7
comes closest to the way you feel?”. Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable
‘EQWLTH’ on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1=Government should do something to re-
duce income di¤erences; 7=Government should not concern itself.; 8=Don’t know;
9=No answer. Our variable is rescaled as (8 ¡ EQWLTH), i.e. it is increasing in
individual support for redistribution.
GOVRED: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that the government should
reduce income di¤erences between the rich and the poor. Original GSS variable
‘EQWLTH’ (see description of the variable ‘Support for redistribution’). GOVRED
takes value 1 if EQWLTH<4 and zero otherwise.
Age: age of respondent in years.
Married: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is married.
Female: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is female.
Black: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is African American.
Educ<12 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has less than 12 years of
education.
Educ>16 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has more than 16 years of
education.
Children: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has children.
31Though the transition matrix is constructed on average hourly earnings, the matching is
done on annual labor income (PSID variable: Total labor income of Head) because the variable
RINCOME in the GSS is on an annual basis. On the other hand, average hourly earnings in
the PSID are obtained simply by dividing total labor income of Head for the number of hours
worked in a year.
26ln(real income): logarithm of respondent’s family income (constant 1986
US$).
Self-employed: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is self-employed.
Unemp. last 5 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has been unemployed
in the last 5 years.
Protestant: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is Protestant.
Catholic: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is Catholic.
Jewish: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is Jewish.
Other religion: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is religious but not Protes-
tant, Catholic, or Jewish.
Help others: dummy equal to 1 if respondent says that helping others is the
most important value for a child. Original GSS survey question: “If you had to
choose, which thing on this list would you pick as the most important for a child to
learn to prepare him or her for life?”. Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable
‘HELPOTH’. Our variable takes value 1 if respondent picks “helping others” as
the …rst most important thing, and zero otherwise.
Prestige>father’s: dummy equal to 1 if respondent’s prestige score (vari-
able ‘PRESTIGE’ and ‘PRESTG80’ in the GSS) is higher than father’s (variable
‘PAPRES16’ and ‘PAPRES80’). For a detailed de…nition of the GSS occupational
prestige scores, see Nakao et al. (1990a,b).
Education-father’s: years of education of the respondent minus years of
education of the father.
RELMOB7: relative mobility index de…ned by expression (6) in the text on
State-speci…c transition matrices. Value for individual whose income is in decile
d in state s is the sum of probabilities of moving to deciles 7 to 10 in year t +1 ,
starting from decile d in year t. Source: authors’ calculations on PSID.
Expected income: expected future income of the respondent de…ned by
expression (5) in the text on State-speci…c transition matrices. Value for individual
w h o s ei n c o m ei si nd e c i l ed in state s is the weighted average of mean incomes for
the ten deciles in year t +1 ; with the weights being the probabilities of moving
to those deciles in year t +1 , starting from decile d in year t. Source: authors’
calculations on PSID.
Fields-Ok: per capita mobility index proposed by Fields and Ok (1996a) and
de…ned in expression (7) in the text. Source: authors’ calculations on PSID.
Fields-Ok (logs): same as Fields-Ok, but uses the logarithm of the relevant
income variable.
Spearman mobility: index de…ned by expression (8) in the text. Source:
authors’ calculations on PSID.
King: index de…ned by expression (9) in the text. Source: authors’ calcula-
tions on PSID.
27CLABEDU: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that class di¤erences de-
pend on one’s ability and education. Original GSS survey question: “America has
an open society. What one achieves in life no longer depends on one’s family back-
ground, but on the abilities one has and the education one acquires”. Prompted
answers coded in the GSS variable ‘USCLASS3’: 1=Strongly agree; 2=Somewhat
agree; 3=Somewhat disagree; 4=Strongly disagree; 8=Don’t know; 9=No answer.
Our variable takes value 1 if USCLASS3<3 and zero otherwise.
CLFAM: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that class di¤erences depend
on family background. Original GSS survey question: “In the United States there
are still great di¤erences between social levels, and what one can achieve in life
depends mainly upon one’s family background”. Prompted answers coded in the
GSS variable ‘USCLASS2’: 1=Strongly agree; 2=Somewhat agree; 3=Somewhat
disagree; 4=Strongly disagree; 8=Don’t know; 9=No answer. Our variable takes
value 1 if USCLASS2<3 and zero otherwise.
CLOUT: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that class di¤erences de-
pend on factors outside one’s control. Original GSS survey question: “What one
gets in life hardly depends at all on one’s own e¤orts, but rather on the economic
situation, job opportunities, union agreements, and the social services provided
by the government.”. Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable ‘USCLASS4’:
1=Strongly agree; 2=Somewhat agree; 3=Somewhat disagree; 4=Strongly dis-
agree; 8=Don’t know; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if USCLASS4<3
and zero otherwise.
CLSTAY: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that class di¤erences persist.
Original GSS survey question: “In the United States traditional divisions between
owners and workers still remain. A person’s social standing depends upon whether
he/she belongs to the upper or lower class”. Prompted answers coded in the
GSS variable ‘USCLASS1’: 1=Strongly agree; 2=Somewhat agree; 3=Somewhat
disagree; 4=Strongly disagree; 8=Don’t know; 9=No answer. Our variable takes
value 1 if USCLASS1<3 and zero otherwise.
CLJUSTIF: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that class di¤erences are
justi…ed. Original GSS survey question: “All in all, I think social di¤erences in this
country are justi…ed”. Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable ‘USCLASS8’:
1=Strongly agree; 2=Somewhat agree; 3=Somewhat disagree; 4=Strongly dis-
agree; 8=Don’t know; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if USCLASS8<3
and zero otherwise.
CLACCOPP: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that class di¤erences
are justi…ed. Original GSS survey question: “Di¤erences in social standing between
people are acceptable because they basically re‡ect what people
made out of the opportunities they had.”. Prompted answers coded in the
GSS variable ‘USCLASS7’: 1=Strongly agree; 2=Somewhat agree; 3=Somewhat
28disagree; 4=Strongly disagree; 8=Don’t know; 9=No answer. Our variable takes
value 1 if USCLASS7<3 and zero otherwise.
OP_EDU: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that not everyone has
opportunity to acquire education corresponding to their talent. Original GSS
survey question: “Does everyone in this country have an opportunity to obtain an
education corresponding to their abilities and talents?”. Prompted answers coded
in the GSS variable ‘EDUCOP’: 1=Yes; 2=No; 8=Don’t know; 9=No answer. Our
variable takes value 1 if EDUCOP=2 and zero otherwise.
OP_HRDWK: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that hard work is
very important to get ahead in life. Original GSS survey question: “How impor-
tant you think hard work is for getting ahead in life?”. Prompted answers coded in
the GSS variable ‘OPHRDWRK’: 1=Essential; 2=Very important; 3=Fairly im-
portant; 4=Not very important; 5=Not important at all; 8=Can’t choose; 9=No
answer. Our variable takes value 1 if OPHRDWRK<3 and zero otherwise.
OP_KNOW: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that knowing the right
people is very important to get ahead in life. Original GSS survey question: “How
important you think it is for getting ahead in life knowing the right people?”.
Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable ‘OPKNOW’: 1=Essential; 2=Very
important; 3=Fairly important; 4=Not very important; 5=Not important at all;
8=Can’t choose; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if OPKNOW<3a n d
zero otherwise.
OP_PARED: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that one needs edu-
cated parents to get ahead in life. Original GSS survey question: “How important
you think it is for getting ahead in life having well educated parents?”. Prompted
answers coded in the GSS variable ‘OPPARED’: 1=Essential; 2=Very important;
3=Fairly important; 4=Not very important; 5=Not important at all; 8=Can’t
choose; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if OPPARED<3 and zero other-
wise.
OP_WLTH: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that one needs to come
from a wealthy family to get ahead in life. Original GSS survey question: “How
important you think it is for getting ahead in life coming from a wealthy family?”.
Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable ‘OPWLTH’: 1=Essential; 2=Very
important; 3=Fairly important; 4=Not very important; 5=Not important at all;
8=Can’t choose; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if OPWLTH<4a n d
zero otherwise.
29Table A1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. No. obs.
Support for redistribution 4.366 1.952 11237
GOVRED .485 .500 11237
Age 44.384 17.419 11237
Married .568 .495 11237
Female .552 .497 11237
Black .137 .344 11237
Educ<12 yrs .260 .439 11225
Educ>16 yrs .195 .396 11225
Children .411 .492 11163
ln(real income) 9.919 .954 11237
Self-employed .115 .319 10599
Unemp. last 5 yrs .230 .421 11167
Protestant .638 .480 11221
Catholic .248 .432 11221
Jewish .019 .138 11221
Other religion .020 .140 11221
Help others .123 .328 5715
Job prestige >father’s .465 .499 9039
Education - father’s 2.803 3.862 8274
RELMOB7, t+1 .390 .371 11237
RELMOB7, t+5 .398 .309 11214
RELMOB7, t+1 (hourly earnings of head) .364 .317 7629
RELMOB7, t+5 (hourly earnings of head) .374 .266 7196
RELMOB7, t+1 (head+wife+ofum) .365 .361 11237
RELMOB7, t+5 (head+wife+ofum) .369 .293 10112
Expected income, t+1 55.555 37.650 11237
Expected income, t+5 61.090 35.682 11214
Expected income, t+1 (hourly earnings of head) 39.401 22.276 7629
Expected income, t+5 (hourly earnings of head) 42.395 21.546 7196
Expected income, t+1 (head+wife+ofum) 56.472 38.035 11237
Expected income, t+5 (head+wife+ofum) 61.710 34.708 10112
Spearman mobility, t+1 .108 .108 10781
Spearman mobility, t+5 .248 .093 10904
30Table A1 (continued)
Mean Std. Dev. No. obs.
Fields-Ok, t+1 9651.87 2412.82 11237
Fields-Ok, t+5 16988.91 4741.59 11237
Fields-Ok (logs), t+1 .323 .078 11237
Fields-Ok (logs), t+5 .500 .121 11237
King, t+1 .182 .043 11213
King, t+5 .277 .061 11213
CLABEDU .409 .492 1293
CLFAM .441 .497 1292
CLOUT .417 .493 1285
CLSTAY .702 .457 1272
CLJUSTIF .526 .499 1304
CLACCOPP .747 .435 1270
OP_EDU .294 .456 1298
OP_HRDWK .895 .307 1438
OP_KNOW .445 .497 1432
OP_PARED .422 .494 1424
OP_WLTH .511 .500 1410
31deciles 1
st 2
nd 3
rd 4
th 5
th 6
th 7
th 8
th 9
th 10
th
1
st 61.57 22.74 8.28 3.61 1.59 1.03 0.55 0.23 0.17 0.23
2
nd 20.91 43.26 20.27 7.87 4.03 1.82 0.80 0.57 0.29 0.17
3
rd 7.78 18.53 39.65 18.67 7.98 3.65 1.75 1.06 0.59 0.34
4
th 4.06 6.46 18.35 36.62 19.30 08.07 3.80 1.93 0.96 0.46
5
th 2.15 3.53 7.05 18.80 35.48 18.92 8.12 3.71 1.54 0.70
6
th 1.52 2.03 3.22 7.15 18.81 35.05 20.63 7.75 2.78 1.06
7
th 0.99 1.11 2.25 3.82 7.17 19.78 36.63 19.78 6.64 1.84
8
th 0.60 0.64 1.15 1.84 3.60 7.29 19.78 41.64 19.48 3.99
9
th 0.42 0.22 0.57 0.99 1.37 2.87 6.01 19.44 51.31 16.80
10
th 0.43 0.30 0.42 0.49 0.77 0.99 1.91 4.10 16.59 74.00
Table 1: Transition matrix for US (t,t+1), average 1967-92deciles 1
st 2
nd 3
rd 4
th 5
th 6
th 7
th 8
th 9
th 10
th
1
st 47.16 23.75 11.61 6.05 3.64 2.68 1.92 1.38 1.00 0.83
2
nd 21.30 31.69 20.29 9.99 5.95 4.18 2.54 1.99 1.32 0.74
3
rd 10.74 19.54 26.32 17.01 10.55 6.31 4.20 2.54 1.75 1.03
4
th 5.98 9.62 17.48 22.40 17.30 11.08 7.19 4.54 2.84 1.56
5
th 4.54 6.03 9.71 17.79 21.33 17.06 10.60 6.67 4.03 2.25
6
th 3.33 3.72 6.07 9.72 17.88 20.88 17.02 11.57 6.77 3.03
7
th 2.69 2.22 3.86 6.67 11.31 18.26 22.10 17.80 10.68 4.42
8
th 2.19 1.73 2.45 4.30 6.13 11.47 19.32 23.87 19.39 9.14
9
th 1.70 1.40 1.84 2.36 3.74 5.99 10.66 20.10 32.33 19.87
10
th 1.12 0.97 0.95 1.40 1.97 2.99 4.73 8.95 19.89 57.01
Table 2: Transition matrix for US (t, t+5), average 1967-87Table 3: Attitudes toward redistribution
Should govt. reduce income di¤erences between rich and poor ?
1 23456 7 D u m m y
NO YES GOVRED
Full sample .13 .07 .12 .20 .17 .11 .20 .47
By year
1978 .12 .08 .11 .21 .17 .11 .19 .48
1980 .16 .07 .13 .20 .17 .09 .17 .43
1983 .15 .08 .11 .18 .16 .11 .20 .48
1984 .12 .08 .13 .17 .15 .12 .21 .49
1986 .12 .06 .11 .21 .17 .09 .23 .49
1987 .12 .06 .12 .21 .17 .09 .23 .49
1988 .12 .08 .12 .20 .18 .10 .20 .48
1989 .11 .07 .11 .20 .20 .13 .18 .50
1990 .11 .06 .09 .22 .18 .12 .21 .52
1991 .09 .08 .12 .20 .17 .13 .20 .51
1993 .12 .08 .12 .18 .19 .12 .18 .49
1994 .15 .08 .15 .21 .16 .09 .15 .40
By region
West .16 .09 .13 .18 .17 .10 .16 .44
Midwest .11 .07 .13 .20 .19 .11 .20 .50
North-Est .11 .07 .12 .20 .18 .10 .21 .50
South .14 .07 .11 .21 .15 .10 .20 .46
34Table 4: Individual determinants of preference for redistribution
Ordered logit. Dependent variable = support for redistribution
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Age -.005¤¤ -.004¤¤ -.005¤¤ -.007¤¤ -.002¤¤
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.0005)
M a r r i e d . 0 3 7. 0 4 4. 0 3 9. 0 0 5 - . 0 1 1
(.036) (.035) (.055) (.038) (.015)
Female .223¤¤ .239¤¤ .257¤¤ .225¤¤ .060¤¤
(.044) (.047) (.045) (.051) (.012)
Black .753¤¤ .774¤¤ .776¤¤ .709¤¤ .171¤¤
(.093) (.097) (.096) (.103) (.030)
Educ<12 .522¤¤ .519¤¤ .479¤¤ .576¤¤ .105¤¤
(.036) (.036) (.077) (.048) (.019)
Educ>16 -.302¤¤ -.310¤¤ -.285¤¤ -.360¤¤ -.044¤¤
(.050) (.050) (.057) (.055) (.020)
Children -.010 -.012 .014 -.019 -.001
(.033) (.032) (.046) (.035) (.016)
ln(real income) -.274¤¤ -.273¤¤ -.264¤¤ -.274¤¤ -.053¤¤
.018 (.019) (.028) (.022) (.009)
Self-employed -.316¤¤ -.320¤¤ -.207¤¤ -.335¤¤ -.099¤¤
(.058) (.058) (.054) (.076) (.021)
Unemp. last 5 yrs .230¤¤ .230¤¤ .187¤¤ .258¤¤ .082¤¤
(.037) (.038) (.046) (.041) (.015)
Protestant -.134
(.086)
Catholic .007
(.080)
Jewish -.190
(.126)
Other religion .407¤¤
(.133)
Help others .250¤¤
(.081)
Job prestige>father’s -.080¤¤ -.007
(.034) (.015)
Educ - father’s .029¤¤ .004¤¤
(.005) (.002)
No. obs. 11782 11769 6642 8716 5602
Pseudo Rsq .03 .03 .03 .03 .05
Notes: ¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the MSA level..
35Table 5: Preferences for redistribution and future income prospects
Dependent variable = support for redistribution
Ordered Logit Probit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Age -.007¤¤ -.007¤¤ -.002¤¤ -.002¤¤
(.002) (.002) (.0005) (.0005)
Married .027 .019¤¤ .011 -.012
(.042) (.042) (.016) (.016)
Female .196¤¤ .200¤¤ .054¤¤ .055¤¤
(.052) (.052) (.012) (.012)
Black .684¤¤ .687¤¤ .156¤¤ .157¤¤
(.094) (.095) (.031) (.032)
Educ<12 .534¤¤ .545¤¤ .091¤¤ .094¤¤
(.052) (.052) (.020) (.020)
Educ>16 -.373¤¤ -.355¤¤ -.048¤¤ -.045¤¤
(.051) (.052) (.020) (.020)
Children -.012 -.014 .003 .002
(.040) (.039) (.016) (.016)
ln(real income) -.177¤¤ -.100¤¤ -.028¤ -.017
(.033) (.038) (.017) (.019)
Self-employed -.346¤¤ -.330¤¤ -.102¤¤ -.099¤¤
(.082) (.081) (.023) (.023)
Unemp. last 5 yrs .256¤¤ .257¤¤ .077¤¤ .077¤¤
(.043) (.043) (.017) (.017)
Job prestige >father’s -.074¤¤ -.078¤¤ -.0002 -.001
(.038) (.038) (.017) (.017)
Education - father’s .031¤¤ .031¤¤ .005¤¤ .004¤
(.005) (.005) (.002) (.002)
Prob(7-10 decile) -.316¤¤ -.080¤¤
(.084) (.040)
Expected income -.005¤¤ -.001¤¤
.001 (.0004)
No. obs. 7714 7714 4891 4891
Pseudo Rsq .03 .03 .05 .05
Notes: see notes to Table 4.
36Table 6: Sensitivity analysis
Ordered logit. Dependent variable = support for redistribution
No in‡uential No migrants Income Avg. income Transition matrix
observations deciles (t-1,t,t+1) US by year
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
coefficient on:
Prob(7-10 decile) -.287¤¤ -.312¤¤ -.872¤¤ -.314¤¤ -.292¤¤
(.081) (.087) (.220) (.087) (.086)
Expected income -.006¤¤ -.005¤¤ -.001 -.005¤¤ -.005¤¤
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001)
Notes: see notes to Table 4.
Controls include: Age, Married, Female, Black, Educ<12, Educ>16, Children, ln(real
income), Self-employed, Unemp. last 5 yrs, Prestige>father’s, Educ-father’s, STATES,
YEARS.
Table 7: Di¤erent income de…nitions and time horizons
Ordered logit. Dependent variable = support for redistribution
Family income
Family income Hourly earnings of head (incl. OFUM)
t,t+5 t,t+1 t,t+5 t,t+1 t,t+5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
coefficient on:
Prob(7-10 decile) -.423¤¤ -.282¤¤ -.310¤¤ -.341¤¤ -.493¤¤
(.110) (.075) (.118) (.091) (.116)
Expected income -.005¤¤ -.006¤¤ -.006¤¤ -.006¤¤ -.006¤¤
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Notes: see notes to Table 4.
Controls include: Age, Married, Female, Black, Educ<12, Educ>16, Children, ln(real
income), Self-employed, Unemp. last 5 yrs, Prestige>father’s, Educ-father’s, STATES,
YEARS.
37Table 8: Other mobility measures
Ordered logit. Dependent variable = support for redistribution
t+1 t+5
coefficient on:
[1] Spearman mobility -.036 .382
(.322) (.231)
[2] Fields-Ok -.011 -.006
(.013) (.008)
[3] Fields-Ok (logs) -.349¤ -.115
(.201) (.224)
[4] King .304 -.370
(.453) (.244)
Notes: see notes to Table 4.
Controls include: Age, Married, Female, Black, Educ<12, Educ>16, Children, ln(real
income), Self-employed, Unemp. last 5 yrs, Prestige>father’s, Educ-father’s, STATES,
YEARS.
38Table 9: Equal opportunities and social mobility
Ordered logit. Dependent variable = support for redistribution
Fraction Coe¤. on Expected income Test
of Yes for those who answer ¯1= ¯0
Yes No (p-value)
[1] Class di¤erences due to .40 -.008¤¤ -.003 .00
ability & educ. (CLABEDU) (.003) (.002)
[2] Class di¤erences due to .45 -.0036 -.007¤¤ .02
family background (CLFAM) (.0023) (.003)
[3] Class di¤erences due to .43 -.002 -.007¤¤ .01
outside factors (CLOUT) (.002) (.003)
[4] Class di¤erences persist .70 -.005¤ -.008¤¤ .04
(CLSTAY) (.003) (.003)
[5] Class di¤erences are justi…ed .52 -.007¤¤ -.0004 .00
(CLJUSTIF) (.003) (.003)
[6] Class di¤erences acceptable, .74 -.006¤ -.002 .20
re‡ect opportunities (.002) (.003)
(CLACCOPP)
[7] Not everyone has opportunity .28 -.004 -.008¤¤ .00
to get educated (OP_EDU) (.003) (.003)
[8] Important hard work .89 -.0001 .008¤¤ .00
(OP_HRDWK) (.002) (.004)
[9] Important who you know .44 .005¤ -.001 .03
(OP_KNOW) (.003) (.002)
[10] Important educated parents .42 .003 -.0005 .14
(OP_PARED) (.003) (.002)
[11] Important to come from .52 .002 -.0005 .08
whlty family (OP_WLTH) (.003) (.002)
Notes: see notes to Table 4.
Controls include: Age, Married, Female, Black, Educ<12, Educ>16, Children, ln(real
income), Self-employed, Unemp. last 5 yrs, Prestige>father’s, Educ-father’s, STATES.
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Figure 1:  Probability of moving above the 6
th decile (RELMOB7
s
5)
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(a)   Probability of moving above the 6
th decile (RELMOB75)
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Figure 2: Time profile of mobility measures for the median voter
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